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Abstract—This paper presents an efficient method for verifying 
hazard-freedom in gate-level timed asynchronous circuits. Timed 
circuits are a class of asynchronous circuits that are optimized us­
ing explicit timing information. In asynchronous circuits, correct 
operation requires that there are no hazards in the circuit im­
plementation. Therefore, when designing an asynchronous circuit, 
each internal node and output of the circuit must be verified for 
hazard-freedom to ensure correct operation. Current verification 
algorithms for timed circuits require an explicit state exploration 
that often results in state explosion for even modest-sized ex­
amples. The goal of this paper is to abstract the behavior of 
internal nodes and utilize this information to make a conservative 
determination of hazard-freedom for each node in the circuit. 
Experimental results indicate that this approach is substantially 
more efficient than existing timing verification tools. These results 
also indicate that this method scales well for large examples that 
could not be previously analyzed, in that it is capable of analyzing 
these circuits in less than a second. While this method is conser­
vative in that some false hazards may be reported, our results 
indicate that their number is small.
Index Terms—Hazard-freedom, technology mapping, timed 
asynchronous circuits, verification.
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
r • ^  IMED circuits are a class of asynchronous circuits that
B use explicit timing information during circuit synthesis. 
This timing information, however rough the estimates may be, 
can potentially reduce the amount of circuitry as compared 
with a design that adheres to speed-independent constraints. 
The estimates for the timing can be verified once the design 
is mapped to a library and actual timing values are known. 
This simplification can lead to significant gains in circuit per­
formance. This was demonstrated in the Intel RAPPID project, 
in which an asynchronous instruction length decoder for an x86 
processor was designed using timed circuits. It was found to be 
three times faster while using half the power of the comparable 
synchronous design [1],
While timed asynchronous circuits offer potential advantages 
over synchronous circuits such as faster operation and lower
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power, these advantages are often offset by the expense of 
the circuit overhead needed to eliminate hazards. Hazards 
are conditions generated by the structure of the circuit or 
timing relationships between inputs and propagation delays 
that can cause incorrect behavior. As synthesized hazard-free 
logic equations are mapped to a given gate library, new internal 
nodes are introduced in the circuit netlist. Each new internal 
node as well as the outputs of the circuit must be verified 
for hazard-freedom to ensure correct operation of the mapped 
circuit. This verification must be extremely efficient to allow for 
many alternative designs to be considered during technology 
mapping. Current timing verification algorithms [2]—[7] often 
suffer from state explosion problems because each node in 
the circuit netlist is treated as a new state variable, potentially 
doubling the number of states.
There are numerous methods for verifying hazard-freedom 
in gate-level speed-independent circuits [8]—[14]. In speed- 
independent circuits, no timing assumptions are made about 
gates or the environment, except that wire delays are negligible. 
An efficient verification method for determinate speed- 
independent circuits is proposed in [10]. Determinate speed- 
independent circuits allow input choice (conditionals) but not 
output choice (arbitration). The work in [10] reduces state 
explosion by examining individual behavior at each internal 
node and approximating this behavior for each state in the 
specification. The hazard-freedom of the circuit is then verified 
by examining this cube approximation. When the number of 
internal signals is high as compared with the number of primary 
inputs and outputs (a feature common of many circuit design 
styles), this cube approximation technique has the potential to 
substantially reduce the complexity of verification as demon­
strated in the results shown in [10].
Abstraction of internal nodes to combat state explosion is 
performed in [15] and [16]. This work, however, is not directed 
at verification of hazard-freedom and requires the use of timed 
Petri nets for all design descriptions including the gates to 
be analyzed. This work could potentially be used to verify 
hazard-freedom, so it may be interesting in the future to explore 
combining this approach with the one proposed in this paper.
This paper extends the work in [10] to verify timed circuits. 
It is often the case that hazard conditions found in speed- 
independent circuits do not manifest as glitches in the real 
circuit implementation due to the actual timing behavior. The 
reason for this is that internal signals, once enabled, certainly 
do fire in some finite time. If the time evolution can be tracked 
in the state space, then it may be possible to identify the sta­
bility of internal signals. Using this timed cube approximation, 
a gate-level timed circuit can be rapidly analyzed for hazards.
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Experimental results show that this approach can be substan­
tially faster than existing timing verifiers. Thus, the method 
presented in this paper has the potential to greatly increase the 
size of circuits that can be verified.
In order to construct a timed cube approximation, it is 
necessary to determine the stability of internal signals using 
some form of timing analysis. There are essentially two related 
approaches that can be applied. The first approach is to use 
a method that finds the time separation between events such 
as those described in [17]—[20]. The second approach is to 
use a state-based approach in which timing information is 
represented using difference bound matrices (DBMs) or zones
[2]-[7]. While time-separation-based methods have been used 
for analyzing both timed circuits and burst-mode circuits, they 
do have their drawbacks, i.e., they are substantially more com­
plex when specifications include either choice or circuits with 
disjunctive behavior, such as OR gates. These methods can 
also be overly conservative at times when the time separation 
is state dependent. In our experience, we have found that 
time-separation methods are efficient when only a few time 
separations are required, but they are very inefficient when 
many are required such as when finding the reachable states of 
a timed specification. It is for these reasons that synthesis tools 
for timed circuits utilize zone-based representations during 
state-space exploration. The ATACS tool, to which we have 
added the timing verifier described in this paper, is one such 
zone-based tool [2], [3], [5]. Since the goal of this paper is 
to utilize this timing verifier during technology mapping, the 
zone-based representation of the state space is already available 
from the preceding synthesis step. For this reason, we decided 
that performing the timed stability analysis beginning from 
the zones associated with a state would be the most efficient 
approach. These zones already contain partial state-dependent 
time-separation information. Starting with any zone, a modified 
timed state-space exploration can determine the amount of 
time elapsed while following a sequence of states. Our method 
starts in a state in which an internal signal changes evaluation; 
when the amount of time elapsed is found to be larger than 
the worst-case delay of the logic, the internal node is known 
to have stabilized. Our experimental results show that for the 
circuits that this paper targets (namely, those produced by our 
technology mapper), the analysis is very efficient and produces 
very few false negative results.
II. B a c k g r o u n d  T e r m i n o l o g y
The verifier described in this paper takes as input a time 
Petri net (TPN) that defines the circuit and the behavior of 
the environment and a netlist that represents the circuit to be 
verified. The verification procedure also creates a state graph 
(SG) to represent reachable timed states. The goal of this 
verification procedure is to identify hazards in the circuit being 
verified. This section describes each of these terms formally.
A. TPNs
Our method uses TPNs [21] to model the possible input be­
haviors and the required output behaviors for timed circuits. Let 
W  be a finite set of wires in a timed circuit. The behavior of a
Fig. 1. TPN for our running example.
circuit is modeled as sequences of rising and falling transitions 
on W .  For any w  G W ,  w +  is a rising transition, and w — 
is a falling transition on wire w.  In the following definitions, 
let Q + and M+ denote the sets of nonnegative rational and 
nonnegative real numbers, respectively. A W-labeled one-safe 
TPN is a directed bipartite graph described by the tuple TPN =  
(W, T, P, F, M 0, so, /, u, L) ,  where:
• W  = I  U O  is the set of wires where I  is the set of input 
wires and O  is the set of output wires;
• T  is the set of transitions;
• P  is the set of places;
• F  C  ( T  x  P ) U (P  x  T) is the flow relation;
• Mo C P  is the initial marking;
• so C  W  is the set of wires that are initially HIGH;
• I : T  —» Q + is the lower timing bound function;
• u  : T  —» Q + U {oo} is the upper timing bound function;
• L  : T  ^  W  is the labeling function.
The state of a TPN is a pair (M, D) ,  where M  is the current 
marking (i.e., the subset of places that hold tokens) and D  : 
T  —» M+ is a clock assignment function that assigns nonnega­
tive real-valued ages to transitions. With every transition t  G T, 
its associated preset  is •£ =  {p  G P | (p, t) G F } .  The postset  of 
a transition is defined as £• =  {p  G P \ ( t , p )  G F } .  Note that the 
preset and postset for places are defined similarly. A transition t  
is enabled  in a state if the members of its preset form a subset 
of the places in the marking of the state (i.e., •£ C M). A 
transition t  is fireable in a state if it has been enabled longer 
than its lower timing bound (i.e., D (t )  > l(t)).  A transition t  
must fire before it has been enabled longer than its upper timing 
bound (i.e., D (t )  < u(t)) .
An example TPN is shown in Fig. 1. In the initial state, 
transitions a +  and b +  / I  are enabled, and exactly one of these 
transitions fires within 2 to 5 time units. The “/ I ” and ‘72” 
notations indicate different transitions on the same signal wire. 
If a +  fires, then b +  /2  becomes enabled and fires within 2 to 5 
more time units, enabling d+.  Note that the timing on the firing 
of d+  is specified in the netlist, which is defined next.
The TPNs are restricted to one-safe nets to simplify the 
software, but this is not a fundamental restriction. Any TPN 
with a finite state space can be analyzed. This includes any 
arbitrary choice constructs in the TPN as well. The state space 
generated for the TPN though must be output semimodular.  
A  state space is output semimodular when the only transitions 
that can be disabled without firing are inputs, and they are only 
disabled by other inputs. Our method cannot analyze the hazard 
behavior of gates such as arbiters since the hazard analysis 
searches for gate disablings, which are inherent in these gates.
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(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Netlist that is hazardous under the speed-independent model, 
(b) Netlist that is hazard-free under the speed-independent model.
B. Netlists
The goal of this paper is to verify the correctness of a circuit 
implementation against a given TPN specification. The circuit 
to be verified is described using a netlist modeled by a directed 
graph NET =  ( V , E ) ,  where:
• V  = I  U O U N  is the set of vertices in the circuit;
• E  C ( /  U O  U TV) x (TV U O) is the set of edges.
Each vertex v E V  represents a node in the netlist. This set is 
composed of both the input wires I  and output wires O  from 
the TPN description, as well as new nodes internal to the circuit 
TV. Each e E E  represents a directed connection in the netlist 
from one node to another node. The set of fanins to a node is 
denoted by F I (v), and thq fanouts are denoted by F O ( v ) . Each 
node that is in TV U O  has an associated gate output function 
f v (v i , . . .  , v r ), where F I { v )  =  { v \ , . . .  , v r }- This gate output 
function also has an associated minimum m inv and maximum 
m axv gate delay.
The netlist for a possible implementation of signal d in 
our example is shown in Fig. 2(a). The set of vertices, V,  
is {a, b, c, d, e j ,  and the set of edges, E,  is {(a,e),  (b,e), 
(e, d), (c, d)j.  The function associated with e is f e(a,b) =  
a n d  (a, b), which has a delay of 1 to 2 time units. An alternative 
circuit implementation for signal d is shown in Fig. 2(b). While 
this model assigns delays to gates, delays on wires are easily 
supported. Consider a signal x  that forks to two different gate 
inputs. Differing delays on these wires can be modeled by 
introducing a fictitious buffer on each branch of the fork and 
then assigning these delays to the buffers. These buffers are 
then included when determining the maximum delay path from 
primary inputs to outputs.
The verification method described in this paper requires that 
the primary outputs cut the circuit. In other words, if all primary 
outputs are removed from the netlist, the netlist would become 
acyclic. Intuitively, this means that there can be no internal 
cycles in the netlist. If there are internal cycles, then to apply 
this method, nodes from TV would need to be moved into O  
such that the circuit would now be cut by its primary outputs. 
Most synthesis tools actually satisfy this requirement. Further­
more, since the goal of this paper is to use this verifier as a 
hazard checker during technology mapping and the technology 
mapper that has been developed satisfies this restriction, this 
seems acceptable. However, in the future, we are interested in 
generalizing this paper to the case where internal feedback is 
allowed.
C. SGs
In order to check correctness, a verification method typically 
uses a specification such as a TPN and a representation of the 
circuit implementation such as a netlist and finds all possible 
states represented using a SG. This verification method then 
checks the SG (often on the fly as the SG is being generated) 
for various correctness properties.
A SG is a labeled directed graph whose nodes are sta tes  and 
edges are sta te transitions. Formally, a SG is modeled by the 
tuple SG =  (S, TsgjS), where:
• S  is the set of states;
• Tgc is the set of transitions;
• 5 S x T$q x S is the set of state transitions.
Each state s e  S  is modeled as a tuple 5 =  {v,z},  where v C V  
is the set of wires that are HIGH in the state, and z  is a zone rep­
resenting timing relationships.Timing information is described 
using zones that are typically represented using DBMs [22]. 
These matrices represent time differences between recently 
fired transitions. Each entry, Zij, in the matrix represents a 
timing relationship of the form rti — rtj < z^,  where rti is 
the time at which ti fires. In other words, represents the 
maximum amount of time in which ti fires after tj (denoted 
max(z, ti,tj)).  The minimal time separation after tj before U 
fires (i.e., m in(z,U,tj))  is equal to —Zj\. The notation var(2:) 
is used to denote the set of variables in zone 2 . An example 
zone for the point right after a+  fires, which represents the 
relationship 2 < r a+ — r c_ < 5, is given by
7c— + 
rc— 0 —2 .
Ta+ 5 0
Using a timed state-space exploration algorithm such as the 
ones in [3] and [5], it is possible to derive a SG using a TPN 
to drive the inputs and check the outputs and a netlist to drive 
the outputs. However, the key result of this paper is that our 
method never explicitly derives this SG. Instead, a SG for a 
com plex-ga te  equ iva len t (CGE) version of the netlist is derived. 
In other words, a SG generated from a CGE version abstracts 
the internal nodes to reduce the verification complexity. The 
CGE circuit for both netlists in Fig. 2(a) and (b) is shown in 
Fig. 3(a). The SG found using this circuit and the TPN in Fig. 1 
is shown in Fig. 3(d). Using v, each state vector is labeled in the 
SG to show the value of all signal wires. The zones calculated 
during the timed state-space exploration are omitted for clarity. 
Each edge of the SG is labeled with a signal transition t E T. In 
other words, Tsg is equal to transition set T  from the TPN. The 
input wire set is {a, b, c}, and the output wire set is {d}. There 
are nine states including 0000 and 1000 and ten state transitions 
including (0000, a+ , 1000). One detail to note is that during 
state-space exploration to derive this SG, this method checks 
that the given CGE circuit is equivalent to the desired one. For 
example, if the CGE circuit given had been the one in Fig. 3(b), 
after a+  fires, the netlist could produce a d-\- when one is not 
expected in the TPN. This complex-gate-equivalence failure 
would then be reported to the user.
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f  in d _ sta b le_ sta tes  ( TPN, SG, NET)
check_. Lty (SG, NET)
Fig. 3. (a) Correct CGE circuit, (b) Incorrect CGE circuit, (c) Another 
incorrect CGE circuit, (d) SG for correct CGE circuit.
Fig. 4. (a) Example circuit to illustrate hazards, (b) Timing scenario for an 
acknowledgment hazard, (c) Timing scenario for a monotonicity hazard.
D. Hazards
Hazards can m anifest in asynchronous circuits due to viola­
tions in the acknowledgment or monotonicity properties [10]. 
This subsection describes these hazard conditions briefly using 
a simple example. Both acknowledgm ent and monotonicity 
hazards are defined algorithm ically in Section III-C.
An acknowledgm ent hazard occurs when an internal node 
becomes excited to change to a new value, but the conditions 
that caused the excitation change before the node can be shown 
to have becom e stable. A node is said to be stable when it equals 
its evaluation. In other words, it is not enabled to change. An 
example of a circuit with an acknowledgm ent hazard is shown 
in Fig. 4(a), and the hazard manifests under the tim ing shown 
in Fig. 4(b). This three-gate circuit implements the function 
g =  abed. The output g should never be enabled to go h i g h  
during the time period depicted in Fig. 4(b) since there is no 
time point in which all four inputs are simultaneously HIGH. 
A t tim e zero, input signals a and d are LOW, while b and c are 
HIGH. This forces the internal nodes e and /  and the output g 
to be LOW. A t time zero, input a changes to HIGH and stays 
HIGH for 3 tim e units. This enables node e to rise. However, 
since the delay of the AND gate driving node e has a tim e delay 
between 2 and 4 tim e units, it is not certain whether or not 
node e actually rises before signal a goes LOW. This represents
Fig. 5. Top-level algorithm for verification.
an uncertainty on node e in response to the pulse on a, and 
the possible failure to acknowledge the transition on a indicates 
an acknowledgm ent hazard on node e. If input tim ings and 
gate delays allow this possible glitch on e to propagate to the 
output, the prim ary output g may have a monotonicity hazard 
as described below.
A m onotonicity violation occurs when an internal or output 
node is supposed to rem ain stable, but it becom es mom entarily 
excited, or when it is supposed to m ake a transition, but it makes 
the transition nonmonotonically. This occurs when a gate has 
a potential hazard, while there is no stable forcing side input. 
For example, a potential hazard exists when the output of an 
AND gate is supposed to rem ain stable LOW or fall, but one 
input is rising. If a side input that is stable LOW cannot be found 
while the other input is rising, it is possible that the AND gate 
may mom entarily evaluate to 1, causing a glitch on its output. 
In the example shown in Fig. 4, it is possible that the glitch 
on node e discussed previously can propagate to the output. 
Consider the tim ing diagram  shown in Fig. 4(c). After input 
a goes LOW at time 3, input d rises at time 4. This causes node 
/  to be enabled to rise and can do so as early as tim e five. A t 
tim e five, both inputs to the AND gate driving the output are in 
transition, and there is the possibility for a glitch on the output. 
This tim ing scenario represents a monotonicity hazard on the 
output g.
III. VERIFICATION A LGO RITH M
In [10] and [23], the following theorem  giving sufficient 
conditions for correctness of a determ inate speed-independent 
asynchronous circuit is presented (reworded to m atch the nota­
tion used in this paper). These conditions are also sufficient for 
correctness of tim ed circuits.
Theorem 3.1—Sufficient Conditions fo r  Correctness: Let 
NET = (V ,E )  be a circuit im plem enting the behavior de­
scribed by TPN =  (W, T, P, F, M0, s 0, Z, u, L). The NET is a 
correct im plem entation of the TPN if 1) it is CGE to the 
TPN and 2) it satisfies the acknowledgm ent and monotonicity 
properties.
Our verification algorithm  shown in Fig. 5 checks these 
correctness conditions. This algorithm takes as input a TPN to 
represent the possible input behavior and the required output 
behavior and a NET to represent the circuit to be checked. 
W hen the circuit is not correct, this algorithm  reports the 
locations of the errors that it finds. This section describes this 
algorithm  in detail.
A. Checking Equivalence
The c h e c k _ e q u iv a le n c e  function forms a CGE netlist, 
uses this netlist and the TPN to derive a SG, and checks if the 
CGE netlist provides outputs when and only when allowed by 
the TPN. The first step is to derive a CGE netlist in which there
596 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 26, NO. 3, MARCH 2007
are no internal signals. In other words, it derives a netlist that 
has one gate per primary output signal. The Boolean function 
for this gate is expressed only in term s of the primary inputs 
and outputs. The delay of this gate is set to the minim um  and 
m axim um  delay from  any input to the prim ary output. Although 
false paths through the logic may exist, this algorithm  need not 
identify them  at this point. Their inclusion results in a higher 
and thus more conservative m axim um  delay. A t worst, this may 
result in a node being falsely determ ined to be hazardous. In 
this example, the CGE representation for the netlists in Fig. 2(a) 
and (b) is shown in Fig. 3(a). This gate’s delay is [1, 4] since 
in both cases, there exists a m inim um  delay path of one and a 
m axim um  delay path of four.
Using this CGE netlist and the given TPN, a SG is found 
using a tim ed state-space exploration algorithm. During this 
state-space exploration, output firings are checked. If  an output 
fires prematurely, such as in the example shown in Fig. 3(b), an 
error is reported to the user. One interesting fact about this cir­
cuit though is if the m inim um  delay of this gate is increased to 
six, then this circuit would actually be correct as tim ing would 
guarantee that d always rises after b + /2  fires as required by the 
TPN. If  during the analysis, an output is expected and the circuit 
does not provide one, an error is also reported. In our example, 
if  the function shown in Fig. 3(c) is used, after a-\- and b+ 
fire, a d+  is expected, but the circuit does not produce it. This 
check models a progress condition similar to completeness with 
respect to specification [9]; and strong conformance [12]. W hen 
no errors are detected, c h e c k _ e q u iv a le n c e  returns a SG.
B. Finding Stable States
A fter the c h e c k _ e q u iv a le n c e  step, this method has shown 
that the circuit is correct at a com plex-gate level. By hiding the 
internal signals before finding the state space, the state space is 
potentially reduced from 0 { 2 ^  * 2l°l * 2^1) to 0 { 2 ^  * 2 l°l). 
W hen the num ber of internal signals is large, as is often 
the case in real designs, this savings can be quite dramatic. 
However, hazards on internal nodes can still produce incorrect 
circuit behavior. Therefore, it is now necessary to check that all 
internal nodes are hazard-free. This is accom plished by deter­
m ining the internal signal behavior implicitly. In particular, the 
f  i n d _ s t a b l e _ s t a t e s  algorithm determines in which states 
and for which state transitions in the com plex-gate SG that 
each internal node is stable. This is accom plished by deriving 
a predicate s t a b l e (5 , n) for each state s E S  and node n  E N  
and another predicate s t a b l e (5 , s' , n) for each state transition 
(s, t , s f) E 5. The predicate s t a b l e ( s , n )  is defined to return 
TRUE when we have been able to determine through our 
analysis that node n  is stable HIGH or LOW in state 5 . It returns 
FALSE when either node n  is found to be changing in state 5 or 
the algorithms are unable to determine that the node is certainly 
stable. In other words, it is a conservative approxim ation of 
the stability of each node in each state. Similarly, the predicate 
s t a b l e ( s , n ,  s') is defined as a conservative approxim ation of 
the stability of node n  during the state transition from  state 
5 to state s '. These stability predicates are used, as shown in 
Section III-C, to determine if there are any hazards in the given 
netlist.
find_stable_states ( T P N , SG,  NET)
foreach  s £ S  and  n  £ V f i n d  e v a l  (s , n )
m o d if i e d  = s t a b i l i z e _ u n t i m e d  ( SG,  NET)
Fig. 6. Algorithm for finding stable states.
stabilize_untim ed ( S G , N E T )
Fig. 7. Untimed stabilization algorithm.
The algorithm to find the stability inform ation is shown in 
Fig. 6. The algorithm begins by first determining the predicate 
e v a l( s ,  n ) by finding the Boolean evaluation in each state in 
the SG for each node in the netlist. This is accom plished by 
simply fixing the values for each primary input and output 
in the netlist to the values given in the state and propagating 
this inform ation through the netlist. From  the SG in Fig. 3(d) 
and netlist in Fig. 2(a), e v a l(1 1 0 0 ,e )  and e v a l(1 1 0 0 ,d )  are 
determined to both be 1. For node e, the states in the set {1100, 
1101, 1111, 1110} evaluate to 1, while the rem aining states 
evaluate to 0.
The algorithm next initializes the stability predicates to 
FALSE to initially indicate that it is not known whether the 
internal signals are stable or changing. The goal of the rest 
of the algorithm is to determine the stability o f the internal 
signals, whenever possible. In the next subsection, a brief 
review of untim ed stabilization, which comes from the work 
in [10], is given, followed by a detailed discussion of our new 
contribution, which is tim ed stabilization. The tim ed stabiliza­
tion routine does not need to be iterated, so it is executed 
first. The untim ed stabilization routine may require iteration 
since stabilizations on one node of the network can influence 
stabilizations on other nodes.
1) Untimed Stabilization: The objective of stabilization is 
to show that at some points in the SG, the evaluations of 
some internal node n  are certain to be stable. The algorithm 
to determine untim ed stability is shown in Fig. 7. An internal 
node is considered untim ed stable if a change in evaluation 
on an internal node is acknowledged on a primary output. 
In other words, for a state transition (s,£, s'), if  transition t 
could only have occurred if the internal node n  is stable at 
its Boolean evaluation, then it can be said that transition t  has 
acknowledged that node n  is stable.
To determine if an internal node n  is acknowledged to be 
stable by a state transition (s, £, s'), the e x i s t s _ p a t h  function 
is used first to check if a path exists from  n  to the output 
transition under consideration. The m u s t_ p ro p  function is then
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used to check if the value at n  must propagate through any 
possible path to the output. This is done by ensuring that all 
functions in the path from  n  to the output have noncontrolling 
stable values on the side inputs. Consider the example netlist 
in Fig. 2(a) and the state transition (1100, d-\~, 1101). There 
exists a path between node e and output d . In state 1100, 
node e evaluates to 1. This value at e must propagate to the 
output because d  cannot go h i g h  until e has gone h i g h .  M ore 
succinctly, output d  switched from  LOW to HIGH as a direct 
consequence of node e going HIGH and the side input c being 
at 0. Therefore, s t a b le ( 1 1 0 0 ,1101, e) is set to TRUE.
The d i s t r i b u t e  function is used to copy this stabi­
lization forward in the SG until a change in evaluation is 
encountered. In particular, s ta b le (1 1 0 0 ,1 1 0 1 ,e )  implies that 
the following stability conditions are TRUE: s t a b l e (1101, e), 
s t a b le ( 1 1 0 1 ,1111, e), s t a b l e ( l l l l ,  e), s t a b l e ( l l l l ,  
1110, e), s ta b le (1 1 1 0 , e), and s ta b le (1 1 1 0 , 0110, e). This 
distribution of stability inform ation halts when it reaches state
0110 since the Boolean evaluation of e in this state changes 
from  1 to 0. The com plexity of the d i s t r i b u t e  function is 
0(1*51), where |*S| is the num ber of states in the SG.
The other transition in the SG that could possibly indicate 
an untim ed stabilization for node e is the state transition (1111, 
d — , 1110). In this case, however, the input c is 1 (a controlling 
value), prohibiting the propagation of node e to the output d. 
Thus, no stabilization can be assumed for the falling transition 
of d. As explained later in the text, this lack of stabilization on 
the falling transition of e indicates a hazard on node e.
A similar analysis of the circuit in Fig. 2(b) finds the rising 
transition on node e acknowledged by d +  and the falling tran­
sition acknowledged by d — since b is HIGH (a noncontrolling 
value) when d  goes LOW. As a result, this circuit is hazard-free 
under the speed-independent model.
2) Timed Stabilization: W hen tim ing inform ation is taken 
into account, the hazard found for the netlist shown in Fig. 2(a) 
may not actually manifest. If this is the case, then node e is 
hazard-free. This section describes our new method to deter­
mine stabilization using tim ing information. Timed stabiliza­
tion attem pts to show further stability in the SG by calculating 
the m axim um  possible tim e through the network to the node 
of interest n  and com paring this against the m inim um  time 
spent traversing the SG. W hen it can be shown that in the worst 
case, a sufficient am ount of tim e has elapsed, node n  can be 
stabilized.
The algorithm to determine tim ed stabilization is shown in 
Fig. 8. For each node n, the algorithm first measures the longest 
path delay from  any prim ary input to node n  and also from 
any primary output, which is an input to the cone of logic 
that produces the signal n. This m ust be done because the 
actual signal that causes n  to change evaluation may not be 
known due to differences in path lengths. For our example 
netlist in Fig. 2(a), this delay for e is determined to be 2. 
This is accom plished using the f  in d _ m ax _ d e lay  function, 
which com putes the longest path in a directed acyclic graph. 
Its com plexity is 0 (\V  + E |). Next, the algorithm initializes 
the v i s i t  array, which is used to let the recursion know when 
a state has been visited along multiple paths when determining 
the stabilization of node n. A t this point, the algorithm finds
stab ilize_tim ed  ( TPA/, SG , NET) ^  *
Fig. 8. Timed stabilization algorithm.
forea^c^ in  rev erse  order
Fig. 9. Algorithm to update the zone.
state transitions ( s ,^ ,s ') ,  where the Boolean evaluation of n 
changes. This indicates locations in the SG where the node n 
becomes unstable. Note that ti is the transition on a primary 
input or output signal that feeds the cone of logic that ends 
with the node n, and the change in this signal’s value is 
what causes n to become unstable. The algorithm then takes 
the zone z associated with state 5 and updates it to include 
transition ti.1 The reason this is done rather than taking the 
zone associated with s' is that ti may have been pruned from 
this zone. It is important that ti is in the zone that is used 
for timed stabilization as ti serves as a reference transition as 
the algorithm moves forward in the SG. Finally, the algorithm 
initializes a p a th  array, which is used to terminate cycles during 
the analysis of a path in the SG.
The update_zone algorithm shown in Fig. 9 adds a new 
transition to a given zone. The first step is to extend the zone to 
include a new row and column for the new transition ti. Next, 
for this extended zone z', it searches var(2:;), starting with the 
transitions that have been added most recently for transitions 
that enable ti (i.e., tj E • •U). The first such transition tj 
that it finds is the causal transition for ti. The maximal time 
separation of ti from t j , z[j is either the upper timing bound 
taken from the TPN when ti is a transition on an input wire 
or the maximum delay in the netlist generating ti when it is a 
transition on an output wire. For all transitions tj that enable 
ti , the minimal time separation of ti from tj, —Zji9 is either the
!We are using a past variable style zone algorithm, so transitions are only 
added to the zone after they fire.
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Fig. 10. Zone creation and evolution.
do_timed ( TPAT, SG,NETr^ ^ ^  n , s, z , tlr d, v i s i t ,  path)
Fig. 11. Timed stabilization recursion.
lower timing bound taken from the TPN or the minimum delay 
in the netlist. The minimum delay in the netlist is computed 
using the f  in d _m in _d elay  function, which finds the shortest 
path in a directed acyclic graph and has complexity 0 ( \ V  +  
E |). For the other transitions t j , z\j and z ,j i are set to infinity. 
At this point, the zone is recanonicalized using Floyd’s all­
pairs shortest-path algorithm to tighten any loose inequalities. 
This recanonicalization step is necessary because tightened 
bounds increase accuracy. In addition, there are often cases 
where no timing relationship is known between a newly entered 
transition and the other entries in the zone. Recanonicalization 
can determine these timing relationships. As an example, the 
zone found for the state 1110 in our example is shown in 
Fig. 10(a). The new zone after adding transition a — is shown 
in Fig. 10(b).
The do_tim ed  algorithm shown in Fig. 11 is used to re­
cursively explore the SG, attempting to accumulate sufficient 
time to stabilize a given node n  before reaching a termination 
condition. This algorithm first marks the current state 5 as 
visited in the v i s i t  and p a th  arrays described earlier. Next, 
it considers each state transition ( s , t k , s f). First, it adds the 
transition tk to the zone. Next, it checks the zone to determine 
if  enough time has accumulated from the reference transition 
U to the new transition tk such that the node of interest n  has 
certainly stabilized. If it has, it must also check that state s' 
has not been visited along a different path. It must be the case 
that the minimum time upon reaching a state along all paths to 
that state has exceeded the maximum logic delay d. Therefore,
if this state is encountered along a different path and did not 
stabilize, then this state transition cannot stabilize node n.  If 
the amount of accumulated delay does not exceed the delay 
d, then the algorithm must determine if  it is going to recurse 
down this state transition. If this state has been seen previously 
upon this path, the algorithm has encountered a cycle of states 
and must not recurse. If the Boolean evaluation of node n  has 
changed, then again the algorithm must not recurse. If this is a 
new state on this path and the Boolean evaluation is maintained, 
then the algorithm recursively visits the state s'. Note that this 
edge may have been found to be stable along a different path, 
but it is not stable along the path the algorithm is currently 
working on. Therefore, the algorithm must say that this edge 
is not stable before recursing. Upon returning from recursion, 
the path variable is set to false to allow other potential paths to 
visit state 5.
Our algorithm has the potential for requiring the exploration 
of a large number of paths. In the worst case, 0(|aS|!) paths 
would need to be analyzed. This complexity bound, however, 
requires the SG to be fully connected and all states to be 
explored before a timed stabilization is encountered. In real­
ity, SGs are typically very sparsely connected, and the time 
accumulated during the traversal would accumulate beyond the 
maximum delay of the circuit being analyzed well before all 
states are considered. Therefore, assuming that the average 
number of successors for a state is x  and the average depth 
required by analysis is y , then the number of paths that would 
typically need to be explored is 0 ( x y ). While this can still be 
a very substantial number, in the experimental results reported 
in Section V, the average value for x  is 1.29, and that for y  is
3.41. This means that each call to do_tim ed  tends to only need 
to explore two or three paths. If the other examples require the 
algorithm to recurse further through the SG before finding a 
point of timed stabilization, then there is the potential that a 
substantial number of side paths would need to be explored. 
For such examples, the value of y  can be fixed, meaning that 
the algorithm would be limited in the path length that would be 
explored. This can improve efficiency at the potential cost of 
more false negative results.
It is now useful to again consider the example netlist in 
Fig. 2(a). A change in evaluation on node e occurs between 
states 1110 and 0110. As mentioned previously, the do_tim ed  
function is called with the zone shown in Fig. 10(b). As the 
SG is traversed, the next transition encountered is b—. Since 
b— fires 2 to 5 time units after a —, these entries are entered 
into the appropriate rows and columns, as shown in Fig. 10(c). 
The timing of the other nondiagonal entries is set to oo. The 
zone is then recanonicalized, and the resulting zone is shown in 
Fig. 10(d). The parameter of interest is the minimum elapsed 
time between the last transition entered, b—, and the initial 
transition a —, which is two in this case. Note that lower bounds 
appear as negative values in a DBM. Since 2 time units is 
insufficient time to say with certainty that node e has stabilized, 
the algorithm considers recursing on state 0010. Since this state 
has not yet been explored on this path and since node e still 
evaluates to 0 in this state, the algorithm recurses to state 0010. 
Upon recursion, the algorithm adds transition c— to the zone, 
as shown in Fig. 10(e), and recanonicalizes to obtain the zone
NELSON et al: VERIFICATION OF HAZARD-FREEDOM IN GATE-LEVEL TIMED ASYNCHRONOUS CIRCUITS 599
check_acknowledgment (SG, NET)
if ( (e v a l(s ,n )  7  ^ ev a l (s; , n) ) and
Fig. 12. Algorithm to check for acknowledgment hazards.
Fig. 13. Algorithm to check for monotonicity hazards.
shown in Fig. 10(f). The new minimum time elapsed from a — 
to c— is 4 time units. Since this number is larger than the 
maximum delay of the AND gate (2 time units), the algorithm 
can mark this edge as stabilized. The d i s t r ib u t e  function 
then copies this stabilization onto states 0000, 0100, and 1000 
and edges (0000, b +  / l ,  0100), (0100, c +  / l ,  0110), (0000, 
a + , 1000), and (1000, b +  /2 , 1100). This is significant in 
that the hazard condition that existed after untimed stabilization 
cannot manifest because of the timing relationships between the 
circuit and the SG, as shown in the next section.
C. Checking f o r  Hazard-freedom
As described earlier, hazards can manifest in asynchronous 
circuits due to violations in the acknowledgment or monotonic­
ity properties [10]. This section explains how our method 
checks for violations of these two properties. While the theory 
used is essentially the same as that in [10], this section intro­
duces new algorithms to perform these checks.
The algorithm shown in Fig. 12 uses the stability information 
found earlier to check for acknowledgment on all excited nodes. 
The algorithm examines each node n  and each state transition 
(s, £, s'),  in which n  changes Boolean evaluation. If n  has not 
stabilized before it changes evaluation, then an acknowledg­
ment hazard is reported. For the netlist shown in Fig. 2(a), using 
only untimed stabilization, a hazard is found on node e for 
the state transition (1000, 6 +  /2 , 1100). Timed stabilization, 
however, detects that this state transition is stable for node e, so 
it is hazard-free when timing is considered.
The algorithm to check a netlist for monotonicity violations 
is shown in Fig. 13. Monotonicity violations are caused on 
a node n  G ( N  U O)  by one of its fanins v  G F I ( n )  in a 
particular state 5 G S.  For each node, all states in the SG are 
applied to the netlist. At this point, the algorithm constructs a 
cube formed from all n  G ( I  U O U N )  and applies it to f n to 
determine if, given what is known about the current state, the 
value of node n  is being forced to a known value. The function 
cube (s) is a cube formed from the values determined on each 
n  G ( I  U O  U N )  using the state vector and what is known 
about internal nodes from the s t a b le  and e v a l predicates.
| (eva l (s,n ) ^ ev a l (bitcomp (s, v) , n) ) ) then
Fig. 14. Algorithm to check for a potential hazard.
Note that the value returned by cube(5) represents a set of 
implementation states. More formally, cube(5) is defined for 
each node v as
{
s(^), if v  G I  U O
ev a l(s ,? ;), if v  G N  A s ta b le ( s ,  v)
X , otherwise
where s(u) denotes the value of signal v in state 5. Note that 
“X ” means that the value of the node is unknown.
Next, cube(s) is applied to the function f n (v 1,^ 2, • • - v r ). 
f n (cube (5)) is written to denote / n (cube(s)(?;i), 
c u b e ^ ) ^ ) ,  • • •, cube(s)(?v)). In other words, the value 
of each fanin in the cube is extracted and applied to the 
function f n . Since some values applied to the function may 
be unknown, the function f n may return X . For example, if 
f n (a,b) =  a n d (a,b),  f n ( 0 , X )  =  0, while / „ (  1 , X )  = X .
If the value at node n  is determined to be unknown, then 
all fanins of node n  are checked for potential hazards. The al­
gorithmic definition for p o te n t ia l_ h a z a rd  shown in Fig. 14 
is modified from [10] to fit the definitions used in this paper. 
To help in the evaluation of potential hazards, a potential cube 
pcube(s, v ) (u)  is formed as follows:
, , /  cube(s)(v), i f u ^ v
pcube(s, v ) (u )  =  < \ -fe v a l( s ,u ) ,  it u  =  v
The potential cube for 5 and v is equivalent to cube (5), except 
at node v, which is set to its final evaluation. The b itcom p 
function referenced in Fig. 14 takes as arguments a state 5 
and node v  G ( /  U O)  and returns a new state that has the 
bit v complemented. This new state and node n  then become 
arguments to the predicate e v a l.
The absence of a potential hazard is determined by examin­
ing the conditions that prevent it from occurring. There are four 
such conditions shown in the algorithm of Fig. 14 and briefly 
described here. A potential hazard cannot occur on node n  in 
state 5 for fanin v:
1) if v is an internal node and is stable in state 5 ;
2) if v is a primary input or output and the evaluation of n  
changes when v  is complemented;
3) if n  is not stable in state 5 and / n (pcube(s, v))  does not 
indicate that n  is being forced to a known value;
4) if / n (pcube(s,?;)) is equal to the Boolean evaluation of 
n  in state s.
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No I Yes
Fail Hazard-Free Netlist
Fig. 15. Technology mapping design flow.
Condition 1 implies that potential hazards can only be caused 
by internal nodes if they are unstable. Condition 2 implies that 
potential hazards are only caused by external nodes when a 
change in their values does not result in a change in evaluation. 
Condition 3 indicates that there is no potential hazard when 
node n is not being forced to some value if n is not stable to 
begin with. Finally, condition 4 implies that there is no potential 
hazard if setting node v to its final evaluation forces node n  
to its final evaluation. If all four of these conditions cannot be 
met, then a potential hazard exists, and a monotonicity hazard 
is reported on node n in state 5 caused by fanin v.
IV. T e c h n o l o g y  M a p p i n g
We have incorporated the gate-level hazard verifier presented 
in this paper within a hazard-aware technology mapper for 
timed circuits. This section gives an overview of our technology 
mapper, but more detail can be found in [24]. Technology 
mapping, which is also called library binding, is the process 
whereby a technology-independent logic representation is 
mapped to a technology-dependent library. As shown in Fig. 15, 
our technology mapper takes as inputs a TPN, a synthesized 
netlist, and a gate library and, in most cases, outputs a hazard- 
free netlist composed of library elements. The technology map­
ping process combines the steps of partitioning, decomposition, 
hazard verification, and matching/covering. If the technology 
mapper is unable to find a hazard-free solution, there are a 
number of optimizations that can be applied [24], and the 
process is repeated until a hazard-free implementation is found; 
otherwise, a failure is reported to the user.
Fig. 16. Technology mapping example, (a) Example circuit req. (b) Circuit 
annotated with hazards, (c) Cover based on area minimization, (d) Cover based 
on hazard awareness.
Partitioning of the synthesized netlist is unnecessary within 
the framework of our research because the form of the synthe­
sized netlist is a single-output cone of logic. Decomposition 
transforms the synthesized netlist into a logically equivalent 
network called the subject graph, which consists entirely of 
base functions. Typical base functions include inverters, two- 
input n a n d  gates, and a state-holding device. For asynchronous 
applications, the state-holding device is a Muller C-element 
(CEL). We employ the same decomposition process used in 
synchronous systems, i.e., repeatedly applying DeMorgan’s 
laws and the associative law to the subject graph.
Each cell in the gate library is modeled as an atomic gate. 
The combinational and sequential cells are single-output logic 
functions. The sequential elements are either CELs or gen­
eralized CELs (gCs) with internal feedback for state-holding 
purposes. A gC incorporates both logic and state holding in 
one atomic gate. The same decomposition algorithm that is 
applied to the synthesized netlist is also applied to each cell in 
the library, resulting in a pattern graph for each library cell. 
This insures that a subgraph of the subject graph can then 
be structurally matched to the pattern graphs in the library. 
Inverter pairs are often inserted in the decomposed netlist [25] 
to increase granularity, which provides more options in the 
matching/covering stage.
An example subject graph is shown in Fig. 16(a). This 
synthesized netlist is the output req from the benchmark alloc- 
outbound. The logic equation describing this netlist is req  =  
ack • y l  • yO. The subject graph in Fig. 16(a) is shown after 
decomposition and with inverter pairs inserted. The subject
NELSON et al.: VERIFICATION OF HAZARD-FREEDOM IN GATE-LEVEL TIMED ASYNCHRONOUS CIRCUITS 601
TABLE I










alloc-outbound 11 0.09 3 0.33 5.6 0 0.09 2.9 0
chul33 9 0.63 1 0.16 3.0 1 0.11 2.2 1
converta 12 0.19 12 0.24 3.8 2 0.11 1.8 2
dff 6 0.19 3 0.12 2.5 3 n/a n/a n/a
ebergen 9 0.14 1 0.15 3.0 3 0.13 1.8 3
half 7 0.41 1 0.13 2.2 1 0.08 1.5 1
mp-forward-pkt 10 0.24 5 0.17 3.5 0 0.10 2.5 0
nowick 10 0.05 3 0.20 3.8 0 0.10 2.0 0
rcv-setup 6 0.22 1 0.16 3.2 0 0.08 1.8 0
rpdft 8 2.93 2 0.30 4.0 1 0.10 1.9 2
sbuf-ram-write 17 31.77 415 0.32 5.8 1 0.20 3.7 2
sbuf-read-ctl 10 0.13 2 0.14 3.3 0 0.10 2.5 0
sbuf-send-ctl 13 54 0.49 0.65 6.1 1 0.10 2.8 1
sbuf-send-pkt2 13 0.07 103 0.42 6.6 0 0.10 3.1 1
vme 12 0.39 30 0.39 4.9 1 n/a n/a n/a
mrl 16 607.43 317 0.30 5.1 0 n/a n/a n/a
tsend-bm 12 589.56 46 5.32 8.6 1 n/a n/a n/a
mmu 22 >595.09 480 0.53 7.1 0 n/a n/a n/a
mrO 20 >593.24 48 0.55 7.1 0 n/a n/a n/a
ram-read-sbuf 17 >678.48 550 0.34 6.0 0 0.18 3.4 0
trimos-send 24 >580.33 127 10.7 25.0 5 4.87 3.6 5
graph is then verified using the gate-level algorithms presented 
in this paper. Fig. 16(b) shows how the nodes are annotated with 
the type of hazards determined during verification. An A means 
that an acknowledgment hazard is found on that node, and an 
M  indicates that that node causes a monotonicity error at the 
output of the gate to which it is a fanin.
The final step of technology mapping is to match pattern 
graphs to the subgraphs of the subject graph. This matching 
process is typically optimized for a parameter such as area 
or delay. For instance, Fig. 16(c) shows how our example 
would be matched when optimized for area. Here, it is assumed 
that each element in the library is assigned an area and delay 
number. This singular focus on area ignores the consequences 
of covering circuits with hazardous nodes. The area covering 
leaves one acknowledgment hazard exposed, and verification 
performed on the resulting netlist indicates that this acknowl­
edgment hazard is still present in the final netlist. In addition, 
a new monotonicity hazard has been created on the output req 
due to timing relationships that have changed in the final netlist. 
This circuit therefore is hazardous.
Fig. 16(d) shows how the same netlist would be covered if 
hazard-freedom is the primary cost factor. Our experience has 
shown that if the hazard-aware technology mapper attempts 
to encapsulate acknowledgment hazards and leave nodes with 
monotonicity hazards exposed in the covered netlist, then the 
resulting circuit is usually hazard-free. For the example in 
Fig. 16(d), hazard-aware covering encapsulates one acknowl­
edgment hazard and leaves the node with the monotonicity 
hazard exposed. The node with the exposed acknowledgment 
hazard is not a problem because the inverter pair preceding this 
node is removed from the final netlist (since its implementation 
is just a wire), and the node with the acknowledgment hazard 
becomes the input node ack. By definition, primary inputs can­
not have hazards. Therefore, verification on this newly covered 
netlist is found to be hazard-free.
V. E x p e r i m e n t a l  R e s u l t s
The gate-level timing verification method described in this 
paper has been tested on numerous examples. Table I com­
pares our new gate-level timing verification method using stan­
dard benchmarks against results for the timed automata tool 
KRONOS [6], a conservative approximation method described 
in [4], and the ATACS explicit-state timing verifier [26]. All 
runtimes are specified in seconds. For KRONOS runtimes, an 
entry with a greater than sign (>) indicates the amount of time 
after which the verification ran out of memory. The runtimes 
for KRONOS and Pena et aUs methods are taken from their 
papers, while the runtimes for ATACS and our new method 
are from a 900-MHz Pentium 4 with 256 MB of memory.2 For 
our new method, an entry of “n/a” indicates that this example 
has an internal cycle and cannot be analyzed using our new 
method. For the smaller examples, our method has comparable 
and usually better runtimes than the other methods. However, 
for larger examples with more concurrency such as trimos- 
send, our method is more than two orders of magnitude faster 
than KRONOS, 25 times faster than Pena et a l 's tool, and 
twice as fast as the explicit state method used in ATACS. In 
addition, our new method shows some reduction in memory 
usage as compared to the ATACS explicit state timing verifier. 
This reduction in runtime and memory usage is directly related 
to the reduced complexity of the SG as stated earlier.
Since our goal is to determine which gates have hazards on 
their outputs, the explicit state method in ATACS is configured 
to continue after finding one hazard and identify all hazards. 
The number of hazards found is reported in the hazards column 
under ATACS. Since the explicit state method is exact, the 
hazards column represents the number of true hazards in these
2We selected this computer as it has a processor with comparable perfor­
mance to the ones available when KRONOS and Pena et al.'s results were 
generated.
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TABLE II






scsiSV 18 1.35 7.9 0 0.13 1.3 0
slatch 29 33.5 53.4 0 0.15 1.8 0
lapbsv 37 20.0 41.5 0 0.17 1.3 0
elatch 38 183 229 0 0.28 1.8 0
cnt3 80 >1000 >256 ? 0.24 1.7 15
srgate 85 >1000 >256 ? 0.29 2.3 0
selopt 164 >2000 >256 ? 0.90 3.3 46
cnt 11 213 >2000 >256 ? 1.20 4.8 78
circuits. It should be noted that KRONOS does not check for 
hazards but instead is only checking conformance, while Pena 
et al. ’s tool halts after a hazard is found. Since all these methods 
are exact, if configured to return all hazards found, they would 
all produce the same number of hazards. The number of hazards 
found by the new method is also reported in the last column. 
When the number of hazards in our new method is larger, 
this indicates that our method found additional false hazards. 
Despite being a conservative approximation, our method found 
the exact number of hazards in most cases. However, in the 
three examples rpdft, sbuf-ram-write, and sbuf-send-pkt2, our 
new method found one additional false hazard. It should also 
be noted that six benchmark circuits included internal cycles, 
which meant that our method cannot be applied. The exact 
methods do not have this limitation.
The key advantage of our new method is its ability to 
efficiently verify circuits with a large number of internal sig­
nals. In order to demonstrate this, a few of our benchmark 
circuits derived from a variety of sources are selected, and gate- 
level circuits that use only two-input NAND gates, inverters, 
and CELs are derived for them. This is accomplished using 
the decomposition procedure within our technology mapper 
described in Section IV. Our results are shown in Table II. In 
all the examples, our method is still able to check for hazards 
in 1.2 s or less, while for the largest examples, the explicit state 
method cannot complete.
Our new verification method uses a combination of timed 
and untimed algorithms to determine hazard-freedom for each 
node and each output in a netlist. It is found that stabilizations 
in the SG due to timing occur much more frequently than 
do stabilizations using untimed (speed-independent) methods. 
These results are shown in Table III. They are not surprising 
because the delays used for the basic circuit elements are 
fairly small (but physically practical), so circuit delays in the 
decomposition, up to the node of interest, are often small, and 
stabilization through the SG occurs reasonably quickly.
The surprising result from Table III is how effective the 
timed stabilization algorithms are. The numbers in the last three 
columns indicate how many nodes in each circuit are found to 
be hazardous. When untimed stabilization alone is used, in all 
cases but one, over half the nodes are hazardous. When only 
timed stabilization is used, this number is reduced considerably. 
The last column indicates the results achieved by first running 
timed stabilization, followed by untimed stabilization. Note 
how timed stabilization alone gives identical results to the case 
where timed stabilization is followed by untimed stabilization.
TABLE III








alloc-outbound 11 6 0 0
chul33 9 7 1 1
converta 12 8 2 2
ebergen 9 4 3 3
half 7 7 1 1
mp-forward-pkt 10 6 0 0
nowick 10 7 0 0
ram-read-sbuf 17 13 0 0
rcv-setup 6 5 0 0
rpdft 8 8 2 2
sbuf-ram-write 17 12 2 2
sbuf-read-ctl 10 6 0 0
sbuf-send-ctl 13 11 1 1
sbuf-send-pkt2 13 11 1 1
trimos-send 24 18 5 5
This is a potentially significant finding in that it says, at least 
for these examples, that there is no need to do untimed sta­
bilization. Since untimed stabilization may need to be iterated 
(unlike timed stabilization), a cost savings in computation time, 
without apparent loss of accuracy, occurs if timed stabilization 
is run by itself.
V I. H a z a r d  I s s u e s
There are two issues that arise, warranting further discussion: 
false hazards and nonpropagating internal hazards.
A. False Hazards
In a small number of cases, our conservative method re­
ports that a node is hazardous when a full-timed state-space 
exploration indicates that there is no hazard present. These 
false hazards are a result of the abstraction method, which 
limits the visible states to those contained in the CGE SG. 
Between any two states in this SG, a number of internal signals 
can be undergoing an ordered sequence of transitions. The 
stabilization algorithms do not always find internal nodes to 
be stable, and if more than one input to a gate is unstable in 
the same state and a forcing side input cannot be found, then a 
monotonicity hazard is reported.
An example circuit to illustrate a false hazard is shown in 
Fig. 17. This circuit is from the rpdft example in the suite of 
examples used by the timed automata tool KRONOS [6]. Here,
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Fig. 17. False hazard example using circuit rpdft. Assume that gates have a 
delay of [1, 1].
a false monotonicity hazard is reported on output node t  in state 
10001 caused by fanin 658. This is seen by starting in state 
00001, where the external signals are stable at the values in 
the state vector. These stable values force signal 658 to be LOW 
and signal 655 and output t  to be HIGH. When signal d  rises 
and the circuit moves to state 10001, signal 655 is enabled to 
fall (through two gate delays) and signal 658 is enabled to rise 
(through three gate delays). However, the algorithm is not able 
to determine the order in which these internal nodes actually 
switch. Thus, in state 10001, neither 655 or 658 has stabilized, 
and a monotonicity hazard on output t  is reported.
After the timed and untimed stabilization has been completed 
for the circuit in Fig. 17, the stability information for state 
10001 is shown on each internal node. For the internal signals, a 
U indicates that this node is unstable, and a 0 indicates that the 
node has stabilized at that value. Note also that all gates have at 
least one stable input, except for the gate driving the output t .
To explore why this hazard is false, the full-timed SG for 
the region of interest must be examined. This SG is shown in 
Fig. 18. Note that between the time signal d  rises when state 
10001 is entered and signal 6 rises when state 10001 is exited, 
internal signals 647, 650, and 658 rise, and signals 655 and 648 
fall. It is clear from this SG that signal 655 falls before 658 rises. 
Thus, there is no actual state in this SG where the ambiguity in 
Fig. 17 is present.
We plan to develop techniques to evaluate if a hazard is 
false or not. When an acknowledgment hazard is found on a 
node n, the state transition (s, £, s') where the hazard occurs 
is reported. For monotonicity hazards, the state 5 and input 
v that cause the monotonicity violation are reported. In either 
case, this information can be used to create an error trace from 
the initial state. This error trace can then be used to perform a 
guided simulation of the circuit to detect if the hazard can occur 
or not. While in theory, this simulation could result in full state- 
space exploration, it is likely only to require exploration of a 
small subset of the state space to determine if it is false or not.
B. Non-propagating Internal Hazards
The intent of the verification portion of this paper is to iden­
tify nodes where hazardous behavior is occurring. However, 
it is known that hazardous activity on internal nodes does not 
necessarily mean that the circuit fails. In other words, if hazards
Fig. 18. Full-timed SG for the region of interest in circuit rpdft. The state 
vector is (d, c, 6, a, 647, 648, 658, 650, 651, 655, t).
Fig. 19. Nonpropagating acknowledgment hazard example, (a) half circuit, 
(b) half state graph. Assume that all gates have a delay of [1, 1].
on internal nodes do not propagate to the output, the circuit as 
a whole may not be hazardous.
An example of one such circuit (there are many) is shown 
in Fig. 19(a). This circuit is called half and is taken from the 
examples used by the KRONOS tool. Fig. 19(b) shows the SG 
for the half circuit. Note that in the SG, stability information for
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internal nodes x94 and x96 is placed in square brackets next to 
each state. After verification, it is found that node x96 has an 
acknowledgment hazard between states 0101 and 0111. This is 
seen in the SG by noticing that node x96 is unstable in both 
of these states, but its evaluation changes, i.e., x96 evaluates to
0 in state 0101 but evaluates to 1 in state 0111. As shown in 
the algorithm of Fig. 12, an acknowledgment hazard is reported 
between two states under these conditions.
After circuit verification, it is also found that output d is 
hazard-free. In other words, the acknowledgment hazard on 
node x96 did not propagate to the output. This is because the 
output is held in a HIGH state by node x94, which is stable at 0 
during the state transition from 0101 to 0 1 1 1 .
The point of this example is that it may be possible to 
declare some circuits hazard-free even when there is hazardous 
activity on the internal nodes. One reason this is often the case 
is because of blocking side inputs such as in the example of 
Fig. 19. This topic is of keen interest because it may be possible 
to develop algorithms that identify nonpropagating hazardous 
activity that has no effect on the primary outputs.
VII. C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a new method for efficiently checking 
hazard-freedom in gate-level timed circuits. This method uses 
a cube approximation of the internal signal behavior that is 
refined with a new timed stabilization procedure. This allows 
our method to avoid generating an explicit SG representing the 
switching behavior of the internal signals. Our experimental 
results show that this new method can be substantially faster 
than previous gate-level timing verification tools. While this 
method is conservative and thus can report some incorrect 
hazards, the number of such false negative results appears to 
be small. This method has been shown to scale very well in that 
it can verify examples with more than 150 gates in less than a 
second, while previous methods fail to complete.
We utilized this hazard analyzer within a technology mapper 
for timed circuits [24], In asynchronous circuits, hazards must 
be avoided, and care must be taken during technology mapping 
so as not to introduce hazards in the design. Therefore, an 
asynchronous technology mapper requires a method to rapidly 
determine when a transformation of the netlist has introduced a 
hazard. The hazard analyzer described in this paper addresses 
this need, making efficient technology mapping of timed cir­
cuits possible.
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